



AFRICA DAILY INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Sahel | Horn of Africa and Red Sea | Great Lakes | Southern Africa | Gulf of Guinea

REPORTING WINDOW	SOURCE CHANNEL	OVERALL CONFIDENCE
15 Aug 2026 10:00 CEST to 16 Aug 2026 10:00 CEST	OSINT ONLY No authorised HUMINT available	MODERATE-HIGH Variable by item

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Key judgement 1 - Sudan's foreign-fighter pipeline is more institutionalised than a simple mercenary deployment: A Financial Times investigation published on 15 August described organised recruitment, training, transit and combat support linking Colombian contractors, a UAE-based security company and facilities in the UAE, Libya and Somalia. Core elements are corroborated by UN sanctions records and Human Rights Watch. **HIGH CONFIDENCE ON THE CORE NETWORK**

Key judgement 2 - The reported scale remains contested: The Financial Times estimated that approximately 2,000 Colombians were involved. UN sanctions material identifies 350-380 recruited personnel, while Human Rights Watch documented at least 300 deployed by September 2025. The larger figure should therefore be treated as a new investigative estimate, not an established fact. **MODERATE CONFIDENCE**

Key judgement 3 - A low-publication window is not a low-threat environment: No other material, independently verified development was identified for the priority countries during the strict 24-hour window. Continuing crises in the Sahel, DRC, South Sudan and Mozambique remain operationally relevant but are not repeated as new reporting without a meaningful update. **HIGH CONFIDENCE ON COLLECTION RESULT**

Coverage note: Weekend reporting latency, communications disruption and denied access reduce observability. Absence of verified reporting does not imply inactivity.

REPORTING BASIS

HUMINT: No authorised HUMINT reporting was available for this edition. Public eyewitness accounts and media quotations are treated as OSINT and have not been relabelled as HUMINT.

OSINT: Findings derive from public reporting and attributed official or party statements. Confirmed facts are separated from claims, unresolved chronology and analytic inference. Publications are identified textually beside the relevant development without hyperlinks.

PRIORITY DEVELOPMENTS | HORN OF AFRICA AND RED SEA

1 | SUDAN / REGIONAL - New investigation maps Colombian contractor pipeline supporting the RSF

OSINT | HIGH CONFIDENCE ON NETWORK EXISTENCE | SCALE PARTLY UNVERIFIED

The Financial Times published an investigation on 15 August describing an organised pipeline that recruited Colombian former military personnel, trained and moved them through facilities in the United Arab Emirates, Libya and Somalia, and deployed them in support of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces. The investigation linked the effort to the UAE-based Global Security Services Group and described contractors serving in infantry, drone, artillery, training and logistics roles.

The core network is independently corroborated. UN Sudan sanctions records state that 350-380 Colombians were recruited through several private security firms and that they served as infantry, artillery personnel, drone pilots, vehicle operators and instructors, including in El Fasher and Kordofan. Human Rights Watch documented at least 300 deployments by September 2025 and verified transit through UAE military facilities. The United States has also sanctioned recruitment and finance nodes connected to the pipeline.

The Financial Times estimated that approximately 2,000 Colombians took part. That number exceeds the publicly documented UN and Human Rights Watch baselines and is not independently confirmed in the sources reviewed for this edition. It is therefore assessed as a credible but unverified investigative estimate. UAE authorities have repeatedly denied providing military support to the RSF.

Assessment: The combination of recruitment agencies, corporate intermediaries, military transit points, finance channels and regional staging hubs indicates a resilient external-support architecture rather than an ad hoc flow of individual fighters. This structure can replace losses, transfer specialist skills and sustain operations despite sanctions on specific recruiters.

Regional implication: The reported use of Libya and Somalia as transit or training nodes broadens the Sudan war's security footprint across the Red Sea and Horn. It also creates monitoring challenges because legitimate security contracting, aviation movements and commercial facilities can mask military support activity.

REGIONAL AND COUNTRY SCAN

REGION	COUNTRIES	VERIFIED 24-HOUR STATUS
Sahel	Mali; Burkina Faso; Niger; Mauritania; Chad	No material, independently verified new development identified in the strict window. JNIM financing and hostage risk remain standing concerns, not new reporting.
Horn / Red Sea	Ethiopia; Eritrea; Sudan; South Sudan; Djibouti; Somalia; Somaliland	Sudan contractor-network investigation reported above. No separate material verified update for the remaining countries.
Central / Great Lakes	DRC; Cameroon	No material verified update identified. DRC Ebola expansion remains on the standing watchlist without a new official increment inside the window.
Southern Africa	Angola; Mozambique	No material, independently verified update identified in the reporting window.
Gulf of Guinea	Togo; Cote d'Ivoire	No material, independently verified update identified in the reporting window.

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

External-support architecture: The Sudan contractor pipeline illustrates how personnel, money, aviation and training can be distributed across several jurisdictions. Sanctions against named recruiters may disrupt parts of the network but are unlikely to dismantle it without pressure on corporate facilitators, transit hubs and payment channels.

Verification discipline: The public evidence strongly supports the presence and specialist employment of several hundred Colombian contractors. The 2,000-person estimate would represent a much larger force-generation system, but it should not drive planning assumptions until additional documentary, official or geolocated evidence emerges.

Collection environment: Sparse weekend reporting increases the risk that significant incidents will appear after the formal cut-off. High-threat theatres should remain under active watch even where this edition records no qualifying update.

INDICATORS TO WATCH | NEXT 24-72 HOURS

- Sudan / UAE / Colombia: official responses to the Financial Times investigation; new sanctions, prosecutions or travel restrictions affecting recruitment nodes.
- Sudan / Libya / Somalia: flight, vessel or personnel movements consistent with renewed contractor rotation, training or materiel transfer.
- Sudan: evidence that Colombian specialists are operating drones, artillery or training functions on the Kordofan fronts.
- Sahel: delayed reporting of JNIM or Islamic State activity; new hostage threats; official reaction to the previously reported ransom-finance assessment.
- South Sudan: donor commitments against the WFP refugee-assistance shortfall or further announced ration reductions.
- DRC: an official Ebola situation update for Bas-Uele, including contact-tracing results, health-worker infections or additional geographic spread.
- Mozambique / Gulf of Guinea: delayed confirmation of insurgent activity or cross-border movement not visible inside the current window.

ANALYTIC STANDARDS AND CAVEATS

Confidence: High = strongly corroborated by credible reporting or direct documentary evidence. Moderate = credible but with meaningful gaps. Low = single-source, contested or otherwise weakly corroborated.

Attribution: Party and official statements remain attributed claims unless independently verified. Publication time is not necessarily event time. The strict window governs selection; older background is included only where required to understand a new development.

Human-source protection: No HUMINT appears in this edition. Future authorised human-source reporting should be identity-protected, separated from OSINT and qualified by source reliability, information credibility and corroboration status.