NEWS

Developments in central and western Mali could facilitate the further territorial entrenchment of JNIM over the medium term. The payment of contributions, local arrangements with communities and possible rapprochement with certain self-defence groups are all potential indicators of a shift in the balance of power in favour of non-state armed actors.

The situation therefore warrants particular monitoring in the areas of Bankass, Koro, Diallassagou, Mopti, Boni, Sandaré and Kayes, as well as along the principal approaches and access corridors leading to Bamako.

SECURITY NOTE

Subject: Decline of Malian state authority in several rural areas and expansion of JNIM influence

Source: Statements attributed to the Minister of State for Reconciliation, Peace and National Cohesion, Lieutenant General Ismaël Wagué, together with information reported by local sources.

General Situation

Statements attributed to the Minister of State for Reconciliation, Peace and National Cohesion, Lieutenant General Ismaël Wagué, during National Youth Week highlight the persistent difficulties faced by the Malian state in maintaining an effective security presence in certain rural areas.

National Youth Week was held from 11 to 16 August 2026 and focused, among other issues, on peace, security, social cohesion and counter-radicalisation. Lieutenant General Ismaël Wagué is the current Minister of State for Reconciliation, Peace and National Cohesion.

According to the information reported, some rural communities are now allegedly being forced to establish arrangements with armed groups to access their land, travel and continue their economic activities.

Expansion of JNIM Influence

This situation may indicate a concerning shift in the balance of power across several areas of central and western Mali. The control exercised by armed groups may no longer be limited to military operations or attacks against the Defence and Security Forces. It appears to be extending progressively into the management of the population’s daily life.

In the Bankass, Diallassagou and Koro districts, reports indicate a possible change in the position of the Dan Na Ambassagou self-defence group, also known as Dana Amassagou. Some of its members have reportedly pursued a process of disarmament or rapprochement with JNIM since June 2026.

This information has not been independently confirmed and should be treated as operational reporting rather than as definitively established fact.

Economic Pressure and Perceptions of Security

Another particularly concerning development is the alleged payment of zakat to JNIM by local communities.

According to the available reporting, several hundred localities situated between Boni, Sandaré, Mopti and Kayes, including sectors relatively close to Bamako, may have agreed to pay contributions to JNIM in exchange for security guarantees or permission to continue their activities.

If confirmed, this would constitute a significant indicator of the armed group’s territorial and financial entrenchment. The collection of zakat would allow JNIM to convert its military influence into a form of political, administrative and economic control over the affected areas.

Security Assessment

The principal threat is now the risk that state authority may be progressively replaced by the de facto authority of armed groups in certain rural areas.

Communities confronted with insecurity and the absence or insufficiency of a permanent state presence may seek pragmatic arrangements with armed groups to ensure their survival and continue their activities.

This dynamic provides JNIM with several advantages:

Enduring penetration of rural communities;
Collection of financial resources through zakat and other levies;
Control over population movements;
Influence over agricultural and commercial activities;
The ability to impose its own rules progressively;
Erosion of public confidence in state institutions.
Evaluation

The situation represents a concerning indicator of the deterioration of territorial control. It demonstrates that Mali’s security challenge now extends beyond the ability of the Malian Armed Forces to neutralise armed groups.

The central issue is the state’s capacity to maintain or restore a sustainable administrative, judicial, economic and security presence in rural areas.

If accurately reported, the public acknowledgement of the difficulties faced by local communities constitutes an important signal: the challenge is no longer solely to combat armed groups, but also to prevent them from becoming de facto local authorities.

Conclusion

Eastern Libyan Military Intelligence Chief Killed in Benghazi Car Bombing
Fawzi al-Mansouri, head of military intelligence for the eastern-based Libyan National Army, was killed when an explosive device detonated in his vehicle outside his home in Benghazi.
Major General Fawzi al-Mansouri, director of military intelligence for Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), was killed on Monday evening in a car bombing in Benghazi.
The explosive device detonated as al-Mansouri entered or approached his vehicle outside his residence in the Hawari district, according to security sources and eastern Libyan authorities. No organization has claimed responsibility for the assassination, and authorities have not publicly identified any suspects.
Al-Mansouri had led the LNA’s military intelligence apparatus since 2024. He previously commanded the Sabha military zone in southern Libya and participated in operations associated with the LNA’s 2019–2020 campaign against Tripoli.
The eastern-based government of Prime Minister Osama Hammad condemned the killing as a terrorist act and announced that an investigation would be conducted to identify those responsible.
Strategic Context
Benghazi is the principal stronghold of Haftar’s forces, which exercise effective control over most of eastern and southern Libya. The assassination of a senior intelligence official within this heavily controlled security environment represents a significant breach of the LNA’s internal security architecture.
The attack coincided with a separate series of drone strikes against oil infrastructure in western Libya, including the Zawiya refinery. No evidence currently indicates that the incidents in eastern and western Libya were coordinated or carried out by the same actors.
Libya remains divided between the eastern authorities aligned with Haftar and the internationally recognized Government of National Unity in Tripoli. Armed groups continue to exercise considerable influence despite the 2020 ceasefire that ended the most intensive phase of the country’s civil conflict.
I4S Assessment
The assassination constitutes one of the most serious attacks against the LNA’s senior security establishment in Benghazi in recent years. Its location is particularly significant, as it demonstrates that unidentified actors retained the intelligence, access and operational capability required to target a protected senior officer inside the eastern administration’s primary centre of power.
Several hypotheses—including internal rivalry, retaliation by armed networks, tribal disputes or action by hostile political and security actors—remain plausible. However, attributing responsibility at this stage would be premature.
The immediate consequences are likely to include tighter security measures, internal investigations and possible detentions across Benghazi. The LNA may also review the personal-security arrangements surrounding senior commanders and intelligence personnel.
The incident does not currently indicate an imminent collapse of Haftar’s authority. Nevertheless, it could expose internal vulnerabilities, intensify competition within the eastern security apparatus and trigger retaliatory action if the LNA publicly attributes the attack to a specific faction.
Intelligence outlook: Key indicators include the identity of those detained, the official attribution of responsibility, changes within the military intelligence leadership, additional attacks against LNA officials and any broader security crackdown in Benghazi.
Categories: Libya | Intelligence | Security and Defence | North Africa
Tags: Fawzi al-Mansouri, Khalifa Haftar, Libyan National Army, LNA, Benghazi, car bombing, military intelligence, eastern Libya, Zawiya, North Africa